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CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DAMAGES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE "TOTAL COST"
METHOD OF VALUING DAMAGES FOR
"EXTRA WORK"
KARL SILVERBERG, P.E.*
INTRODUCTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE "TOTAL COST" METHOD
It has been said that for every wrong there is a remedy.
However, when a construction contractor performs "extra work"
and a dispute arises over the reasonableness of the claimed costs,
the contract law requirement that damages must be proven to a
reasonable certainty can become a significant hurdle for the
contractor in obtaining a remedy. This occurs when the "extra
work" performed is so unique and so enmeshed with the original
contract work that it is impossible to independently verify the
reasonableness of the contractor's claimed damages. This
situation often arises when the "extra work" is in the form of the
original contract being made more difficult to perform. To
account for the special nature of the construction business the
"total cost" method has evolved;' in such cases the fact of
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2003; B.S.M.E., Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, M.S.C.E., Rutgers University. The author worked as a structural
engineer for seven years prior to attending law school and is a licensed Professional
Engineer in the state of New York.
I See Bernhard A. Aaen, The Total Cost Method of Calculating Damages in
Construction Cases, 22 PAC. L.J. 1185, 1186 (1991) (commenting: "Although not unique to
cases involving construction projects, the total cost method of calculating damages is most
often used in these construction cases"); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in
Construction Cases: Restitution, Relationship, and Revision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 799, 800-01
(1989) (noting that disputes involving claims for "extra work" are prevalent in
construction contracts); Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled
Contractual Waters, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 715 (2002) (remarking on flexibility of
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damages is certain, but the amount is less certain.2
The "total cost" method is not a formula but a set of legal
safeguards designed to protect the party in breach from a
runaway damage claim. It is used hesitantly by the courts3 but
used nonetheless due to the difficulties the non-breaching party
faces in proving damages to a reasonable certainty.4 These
difficulties arise because most construction contracts are unique
in that the end product is a custom made product and the
conditions of performance are singular to a particular place and
time.5 Consequently, when the performance is made more
difficult, there is often no exact and ideal model with which to
compare the damages in order to confirm the reasonableness of
the claim.6 In these situations the non-breaching party can only
look to its cost overrun for the completed job as a measure of its
damages, that is, its total cost of performance less the contract
"[miodern rules of contract law" and "'total cost' method of calculating damages under a
construction contract when a defendant hinders a contractor's performance").
2 See Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1307 (5th Cir.
1986) (noting "total cost" is used where actual cost is unavailable); see also Servidone
Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (pointing out that "total
cost" method should only be used "in those extraordinary circumstances where no other
way to compute damages was feasible"); McKie v. Huntley, 2000 SD 160, P22 (2000)
(arguing "total cost" is appropriate where it is difficult to determine losses from changed
conditions).
3 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1307 (noting direct cost analysis not applicable); see also
Servidone, 931 F.2d at 862 (positing when no other way to determine damages exists, use
"total cost" method). See generally McIe, 2000 SD 160 at P22 (arguing where it is
difficult to determine losses use "total cost").
4 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1308-09 (describing problem in proving damages when
work made more difficult and cannot be compared to other work); see also Servidone, 931
F.2d at 862 (condoning "total cost" for differing site condition which led to difficulty in
damage measurement). See generally McKie, 2000 SD 160 at P3 (discussing owner caused
difficulties encountered with performance of contract).
5 See Adam B. Brotman, Note, The Ties of Natural Justice: Restoring Quantum
Meruit for Contractors in Washington, 69 WASH. L. REV. 431, 435 (1994) (highlighting
difficulty in preparing bid for custom-built structure). See generally Gene Ming Lee, A
Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1996)
(indicating difficulties faced in obtaining reliable bids); Kai-Nildas A. Schneider,
Maryland's Application of Promissory Estoppel in Construction Industry Bidding
Disputes: Eliminating Further Confusion, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 171, 171 (2000) (noting
parties' reliance on estimates in order to accurately submit bids).
6 See Aaen, supra note 1, at 1186 (discussing difficulty of proving construction
damages); see also Lynn Hawkins Patton & Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Claims for Lost Labor
Productivity, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, April 2000, at 21 (discussing difficulty of proving
labor productivity damages to required certainty); Stuart Sobel, The Modified Total Cost
Method of Determining Damages, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Fall 2001, at 5 (analogizing
"individual impacts to a construction project" to a "stone that causes the waves on a
pond," however pointing out that "in most construction projects, the pond is not perfectly
round, and many stones of different sizes are dropped and thrown randomly and
repeatedly from different sources, at different angles, and at different times into a pond
whose surface is being whipped by swirling winds, landing geese, and diving frogs").
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price; this being the method of calculating damages under the
"total cost" method. This "cost overrun" as a measure of the
damages will be deemed acceptable when the four prong
safeguards of the "total cost" method are satisfied. These
safeguards require the non-breaching party/contractor to show:
(1) the impracticability of proving the cost of the "extra work" by
other means; (2) the reasonableness of the contract price; (3) the
reasonableness of the actual costs; and (4) the lack of
responsibility for the increased cost of performance.
A note on terminology needs to be made here. In the context of
construction disputes the parties are usually postured as an
owner versus a contractor, where the contractor is the
performing party; but the parties can also be a contractor versus
a sub-contractor, where the sub-contractor is the performing
party. For purposes of this paper the issue will generally be
presented in terms of owners and contractors.
Additionally, it is important to note that proving liability is not
the same as proving damages, and that issues of liability must be
resolved first. It is only after the contractor has won on the
merits of its underlying claim that the contractor enters into the
realm of proving the quantum of its damages, and it is at this
point the "total cost" method may surface.7 Furthermore,
causation, in the form of tying the breach to an actual increase in
the cost of performance is a separate issue from determining the
amount of increased cost due to the breach once causation has
been accepted. The two are related only in that both can be
difficult to prove when it comes to construction claims. 8
In almost all construction projects, especially large complex
7 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1309 (stating breaching party's argument that even if
claim is meritorious damages not yet proven); see also McKie, 2000 SD 160 at P22
(noting: "Once liability is established by a preponderance of the evidence, the total cost
method of calculating damages may be appropriate for those disputes where it is difficult
or impractical to quantify losses from changed conditions"); Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190-
91 (commenting: "The total cost method is not a substitute for proof of causation but
rather a method for calculating the amount of damages").
8 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1307 (stating "Middle South's next claim is that even if
Bechtel breached the contract by obstructing the structural steel, Bagwell was
nevertheless not entitled to damages because it failed to sufficiently prove that Bechtel's
actions caused any specific damage, or the amount thereof"); see also Aaen, supra note 1,
at 1186 (noting difficulty of proving construction damages); Patton & Gatlin, supra note 6,
at 21 (addressing difficulty of proving labor productivity damages to required certainty);
Sobel, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing effects of impact in one part of project on cost of
overall project).
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ones, "extra work" is inevitable. 9 "Extra work" can be defined as
work that the contractor performs which it believes is outside the
scope of the original contract and for which it believes extra
compensation is warranted.10 Generally "extra work" can take
the form of either extra end product and/or an increased level of
difficulty in performing the contract.'] Construction contracts
provide for such changes through contract clauses such as a
"change order clauses," "extra work clauses," and "differing site
condition clauses."' 2 These clauses allow the job to progress when
work is required outside the scope of the original contract,
requiring both that the contractor perform the work, and the
owner pay the fair value of such work.13
Problems arise, though, when the owner claims the "extra
work" at issue was part of the original contract,14 thereby
expecting the contractor to absorb the cost of the work in dispute
as part of its cost of performance - with the contractor taking
the opposite view. 15 In terms of construction projects, the type of
9 See Galligan, supra note 1, at 835 (commenting on need for extra work clauses
generally); see also Aaen, supra note 1, at 1186 (noting many reasons exist for adjusting
contract price). See generally Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1302-06 (analyzing change and extra
work clause of contract).
10 See Galligan, supra note 1, at 801 (defiming extra work as "any work beyond the
scope of the original contract which, as a result, is not compensable thereunder [sic]"); see
also Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 233, 248 (1970) (describing cost of extra work
resulting from change orders or changed conditions). See generally Servidone Constr.
Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing costs resulting from
differing site conditions).
I" See Galligan, supra note 1, at 802 (describing extra work occurring "(1) When work
beyond that provided for in the contract is performed, resulting in an additional structure
or end-product; (2) when an assumed method of performance is changed, thereby
rendering performance more difficult and more expensive; or (3) when the owner breaches
his contract, thereby rendering performance more burdensome"); see also Bagwell, 797
F.2d at 1302-06 (discussing increased costs resulting from interference by owner with
contractor's performance). See generally Servidone, 931 F.2d at 861 (discussing claim for
problems from differing site condition).
12 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1302-06 (noting change and extra work clause of contract);
see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 504, 507-08 (1951)
(discussing various contract clauses for changed conditions and extra work). See generally
Galligan, supra note 1, at 813 (explaining that vehicles for change are often incorporated).
13 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1302-06 (addressing change and extra work clause of
contract); see also Aaen, supra note 1, at 1186 (discussing extra costs on construction
projects); Galligan, supra note 1, at 800 (noting factors that make pre-contract predictions
of extra work difficult).
14 See Concrete Placing Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 369, 372 (1992) (claiming
extra work was due to contractor misusing product); see also Baldi Bros. Constructors v.
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 74, 79 (2001) (stating disagreement over soil condition as
differing site condition); Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl.
516, 541 (1993) (noting disagreement over presence of rock being differing site condition).
15 See Binks Mfg. Co. v. Bedwell Co., No. 96-2554, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11661, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 1997) (stating: "Both parties acknowledge that the redesign
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"extra work" that results in more difficult performance of the
contract and which then tends to lead to the eventual use of the
"total cost" method usually arises in one of two ways, either the
existence of differing site conditions,16 or an owner interference
with the contractor's performance.17 Differing site conditions
generally include those changes that are beyond the power of any
party to control. The classic example is a differing soil
condition,18 but can also include conditions of a different nature
such as changes in an allowable sequence of road closures that
have an impact on performance.19 Examples of owner
interference include failure to schedule site access for the
contractor2O or not preparing the site for the expected work.2 1
significantly modified the original scope of work and the subcontract between them, [but
tihey contest, however, the effect the redesign had on cost"); see also Neal & Co. Inc. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 385, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting argument over costs of extra
work); Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541 (discussing argument over how to value extra work).
16 See Baldi Bros., 50 Fed. Cl. at 79 (noting issue involves differing site conditions);
see also Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541 (asserting claim of differing site condition). See
generally Great Lakes 119 Ct. Cl. at 539-40 (discussing extensive problems and dispute
involving differing soil conditions).
17 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1308-09 (describing difficulty of proving damages when
work made more difficult by owner); see also McKie v. Huntley, 2000 SD 160, P3 (2000)
(discussing owner caused difficulties encountered with performance of contract). See
generally Galligan, supra note 1, at 802 (describing extra work occurring "when an
assumed method of performance is changed... or when the owner breaches his
contract").
18 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(discussing claim for problems from differing site condition); see also Baldi Bros., 50 Fed.
Cl. at 79 (noting issue involves differing site conditions); Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541
(asserting claim of differing site condition).
19 See Mergentime Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 89-1055 (HHG),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *9 (D.D.C. July 22, 1997) (discussing claim for reliance
on traffic plan when calculating bid); see also Gerhardt F. Meyne Co. v. United States,
110 Ct. Cl. 527, 545-46 (1948) (indicating that additional costs result from road closures).
See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Allocating the Risk of the Unforeseen, Subsurface and
Latent Conditions in Construction Contracts: Is There Room for the Common Law, 46
KAN. L. REV. 115, 132 (1997) (noting primary purpose of differing site condition clause).
20 See Mctge, 2000 SD 160 at P3 (discussing owner caused difficulties including
"inadequate access to the site, improper excavation, difficulty in obtaining necessary
elevations and dimensions, and numerous changes to the blueprints"); see also Bagwell,
797 F.2d at 1301 (noting that contractor was not authorized to perform work in any area
without issuance of work release by owner). See generally Galligan, supra note 1, at 800
(listing various factors that may lead to owner delay, including human error).
21 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1301 (describing difficulties due to "obstructions in the
areas it was to fireproof, including some installed heating, ventilating, and air
conditioning equipment"); Maria R. Lamari, Note, The Role of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Government Construction Contract Disputes, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 205, 209
(1994) (explaining option recommended by government that owner prepare Geotechnical
Design Summary Report ("GDSR") for all construction projects, which would provide
contractor with written summary setting forth" baseline" for all anticipated conditions
contractor can expect, so that if "conditions are materially different from those depicted in
the baseline, and the contractor is unable to perform the contract for the price agreed
2003]
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Owner interference can also include "actual" or "constructive"
acceleration of the work, which occurs when the owner forces the
contractor to complete work at a faster pace than required.22 If
the contractor is successful in proving the merits of the
underlying claim, thus entitling it to extra compensation for
"extra work," then the contractor moves to the next hurdle, proof
of the quantum of the compensation due, and here it may have to
resort to the "total cost" method in presenting those damages.23
"Total cost" measures the value of the "extra work" by
subtracting the "contract price" from the total cost of
performance, 24 with the difference representing the increased
cost of performance that is being claimed as the damages.
Though this might seem simple and logical, it is often challenged
as producing results that are merely "speculative."25 Damages
upon, the contractor is entitled to an increase in the contract price," thus clearly placing,
upon owner, responsibility that site be prepared according to GDSR). See generally
Galligan, supra note 1, at 800 (noting importance of pre-construction plans to ensure
expected site conditions).
22 See Azure v. United States, No. 96-5054, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *7 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) (defining "actual" acceleration as an express order by the owner to
accelerate work, allowable under the standard changes clause of the contract, with an
expected concomitant equitable adjustment for the contractor, "[hiowever, if the
contractor was entitled to an extension of time due to excusable delays and, therefore, an
adjusted contract completion date, an instruction to complete the project according to the
original contract completion date is a [']constructive[I'] acceleration and therefore within
the changes clause of the contract"); see also Norair Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 229 Ct.
Cl. 160, 164 (1981) (listing three factors to be established by plaintiff to recover for
increased costs of acceleration); Stuart A. Weinstein-Bacal & Dennis B. Parces-Enriquez,
Constructon m Puerto Rico: Navigating the Legal Quagmire, 71 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 29, 99
(2002) (discussing circumstances under which contractor is entitled to additional
compensation as a result of acceleration of work).
23 See Mc]I'e, 2000 SD 160 at P22 ("Once liability is established by a preponderance
of the evidence, the total cost method of calculating damages may be appropriate for those
disputes where it is difficult or impractical to quantify losses from changed conditions");
see also United States exrel. Gray-Bar Electric Co. v. J. H. Copeland & Sons Constr., Inc.
568 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that party seeking to collect damages has
burden of proving extra costs incurred); Weinstein-Bacal & Parces-Enriquez, supra note
22, at 100 (describing situation where claims may be made on total cost basis).
24 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(explaining "total cost method derives damages as the difference between a contractor's
actual costs and its original bid"); Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1307 (noting courts employ "total
cost" method when "contract price is subtracted from the total cost of performance and the
difference is considered the amount of the change"); see also Aaen, supra note 1, at 1186
(stating "'total cost method'.., is accepted as determining the amount of the change by
subtracting the contract amount from the total cost of performance").
25 See McnIe, 2000 SD 160 at P16 (noting circuit court's order which "granted McKie's
motion for summary judgment, concluding that Huntley's damage calculations were
speculative."); see also Servidone, 931 F.2d at 862 (discussing how "inaccuracies and
inefficiencies can thus skew accurate computation of damages" when using "total cost"
analysis); Ross v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss., 400 F. Supp. 45, 52 (S.D.
Miss. 1974) (commenting that "[allthough under Mississippi Law the lack of a perfect
measure of damages does not preclude recovery, nonetheless they must be proved with
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measured this way will be inherently "speculative" for two
reasons: first the contractor's increased cost of performance could
be partially due to its own inefficiency. Second, the original
contract could have been priced too low so that part of the
claimed damages is the contractor making up for a losing
contract. If the owner breaches the contract, the owner is
obligated to pay only for the "extra work" caused by its breach,
and is not responsible for making up a loss that a contractor
suffers from underbidding a job. For these reasons using merely
the contractor's claim of its increased cost of performance may
not yield the increased cost exclusively due to the "extra work."26
To obtain with certainty the true value of what is exclusively the
cost of the "extra work" requires determining the "ideal cost" for
the original contract and the "ideal cost" for the contract with the
"extra work."27 The difference between these two amounts will
yield the true value of exclusively the "extra work." The problem
is that no one knows what the "ideal costs" actually are, which is
why the "total cost" method exists.
In order to ensure the least speculative damage claim by the
contractor, and acceptability by courts when inherent proof
limitations exist, the four-part test known as the "total cost"
method has developed. 28 Stated again, under the "total cost"
reasonable certainty and may not be speculative or conjectural').
26 See McKle, 2000 SD 160 at P21 (noting that "method impermissibly assumes that
the contractor 'flawlessly performed its work, and that the contractor accurately and
precisely estimated the cost of the work to be performed"); see also Servidone, 931 F.2d at
862 (emphasizing that under the "total cost" method, "bidding inaccuracies can
unjustifiably reduce the contractor's estimated costs"); Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1307
(commenting that under "total cost" method, non-breaching party's own inefficiencies and
problems are not taken into account when determining increased costs).
27 See Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 178 So. 2d 838, 853 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1965)
(stating a party who has breached his contract "will not be permitted to escape liability
because of the lack of a perfect measure of damages . . . [tiherefore, a reasonable basis
for computation and the best evidence which is obtainable under the circumstances...
and which will enable the trier to arrive at a fair approximate estimate of loss is sufficient
proof"). See generally Major Nathanael Causey et al., 1994 Contract Law Developments
- The Year in Review 1995 ARMY LAW. 3, 56 (1995) (implying that finding of interference
resulting in extra work entitles contractor to award of damages); Candace S. Kovacic, A
Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 547, 582 (1986)
(suggesting that in extra work cases courts usually award reasonable value of plaintiffs
services as opposed to defendant's gain).
28 See Bagwell, 797 F.2d at 1307 (accepting "total cost" when alternate methods are
unavailable); Mclie, 2000 SD 160 at P22 (stating: "Once liability is established by a
preponderance of the evidence, the total cost method of calculating damages may be
appropriate for those disputes where it is difficult or impractical to quantify losses from
changed conditions"); see also Collins Elec. Co. v. Simplex Time Recorder Co., No. 35945-
2-I, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 708, at *11 (May 5, 1997) (commenting claimant has "burden
2003]
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method the performing party must show: (1) the impracticability
of proving the cost of the "extra work" by other means; (2) the
reasonableness of the contract price; (3) the reasonableness of the
actual costs; and (4) the lack of responsibility for the increased
cost of performance. 29 The "total cost" method does not solve the
problem of determining the true value of the "extra work" but
rather serves to mitigate the risk of over valuing the claimed cost
of the "extra work" performed by the contractor.30 Even with the
four-prong "safeguards," some courts are nonetheless hesitant
about using it; courts choose between either dismissing the
contractor's measure of damages as speculative or allowing use of
the "total cost" method. For this reason courts continue to
shroud the "total cost" method in language such as "[use] with
caution and as a last resort,"31 and only use in "extraordinary
circumstances." 32 Albeit reluctantly, courts do accept the "total
cost" method because as one court noted: "Although the method
used in obtaining the measure of damages [(total cost)] is not
entirely without fault, ... as a general rule, a party who has
broken his contract will not be permitted to escape liability
because of the lack of a perfect measure of damages caused by his
breach."33
A note needs to be made on the use of the term "actual cost" in
the third prong. Actual cost refers to the total cost of
performance of the contract, meaning the contract price plus the
cost overrun.
This article will discuss the "total cost" method of valuing
damages. Part I discusses a general overview of the problem.
of fully substantiating the reliability of proof for each element").
29 See Servidone, 931 F.2d at 861 (noting "total cost" four-part test must be met to
show damages); Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 541
(1993) (enumerating "set of criteria which the plaintiff must establish in order to secure a
recovery of damages under" four part "total cost" test); WRB Corp. v. United States, 183
Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (pointing out that "acceptability of the ['total cost'] method hinges
on proof that (1) the nature of the particular losses make it impossible or highly
impracticable to determine them with a reasonable degree of accuracy; (2) the plaintiffs
bid or estimate was realistic; (3) its actual costs were reasonable; and (4) it was not
responsible for the added expenses").
30 See McKie, 2000 SD 160 at P21 (stating that "total cost" is not proof of damages but
method of calculating damages); see also Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190-91 (positing that
"total cost" does not substitute for proof of causation); Sobel, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing
"total cost" runs contrary to preferred methods of measuring damages due to proof of
causation problems).
31 Servidone, 931 F.2d at 861.
32 Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541.
33 Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 178 So. 2d 838, 853 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1965).
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First, a hypothetical example is presented showing the conditions
that give rise to the "total cost" method and highlighting why
courts "reluctantly" use this method. Second, a hypothetical
example is presented that shows the application of the four prong
method and discusses the method's drawbacks for the contractor.
Those more experienced with these issues may find these
examples overly simplistic, but for the person engaging this
subject for the first time it may be useful. Third, a discussion of
the alternate methods for calculating damages is presented.
Fourth, the "total cost" method is compared to recovery for
restitution. Part II discusses the historical basis of the current
"certainty" standard for damages and the development of the
"total cost" method through the 1950's and 1960's. Finally, Part
III discuses the application of the four prongs as shown through
case examples.
It should also be noted that some courts differentiate between
the so-called "modified total cost method" and the plain "total
cost method."34 This differentiation seems unwarranted; when
courts do differentiate, the court is assuming "total cost" to be a
straight subtraction of total cost of performance from the contract
price without any adjustment for the non-breaching
party's/contractor's fault or liability, while the "modified" method
apportions this straight "total cost" claim accounting for the
faults of the contractor. 35  This paper makes no such
differentiation; from the earliest cases, a straight "total cost" was
only intended to be the "starting point,"36 and adjustments made
as deemed necessary to account for liability of the performing
party,37 and further, it is a fundamental tenet of legal remedies
34 See Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541 (explaining: "The modified total cost method is
simply the total cost method modified or adjusted for any deficiencies in the plaintiffs
proof in satisfying the four requirements of said method"); see also Servidone, 931 F.2d at
862 (noting "modified total cost" method as alternative to "total cost" method); Aaen,
supra note 1, at 1187-88 (positing "Many courts have used what has been termed a
modified total cost approach .. ").
35 See Servidone 931 F.2d at 862 (discussing "total cost" as only a "starting point" to
reach "modified total cost"); Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 541 (noting: "In other words, to the
extent that the court modifies any of the four-prongs of the total cost test, the court has,
in actuality, utilized the modified total cost method as opposed to the total cost method.");
Aaen, supra note 1, at 1187-88 (commenting that "modified total cost" "adjusts the
contract amount for mistakes the contractor may have made in his or her estimate, and
adjusts the total cost for problems attributable to the contractor").
36 Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 233, 247 (1970).
37 See id. at 247 (stating "total cost" is only "starting point" with adjustments to be
made thereafter to obtain accurate measure of increased cost); see also MacDougald
2003)
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that the breaching party is not responsible for cost attributable to
the non-breaching party.3 8
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM
Hypothetical: Statement of Problem
To highlight the kind of situation that calls for the "total cost"
method and the reasons courts are concerned with using it
consider the following example.
A painter contracts with an owner to paint a room for a fixed
price believing it will take eight hours to complete the work. Let
us assume that this eight-hour estimate was based on a
contractual agreement that the painter would have the room to
himself so he could work in an undisturbed setting. Now suppose
upon starting work the painter finds out that there are other
workers in the room such as electricians and carpenters that the
painter has to work around, forcing the painter to expend more
time performing the contract. The painter paints the room but to
complete the job it now takes fifteen hours instead of eight hours
as planned. First an assumption has to be made that the
presence of the additional workers in the room actually made
painting the room more difficult resulting in some amount of
"extra work"; this first assumption is actually a causation
problem and is not the same problem as quantifying the amount
of "extra work." For purposes of this example let us accept that
the presence of other workers in the room did cause "extra work"
for the painter and that the owner is responsible for
compensating the painter for the "extra work." The next problem
is to determine to a reasonable certainty the cost of the "extra
work"; that is, the cost due to exclusively the painter having to
Constr. Co. v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 210, 261 (1952) (examining bid to account for
mistakes and verifying reasonableness of actual costs); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 504, 559 (1951) (adjusting bid to average of other bids and
verifying reasonableness of actual costs).
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981) (commenting that
"damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided"); see also
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.12 (2d ed. 2000) (stating: "A
court ordinarily will not compensate an injured party for losses that party could have
avoided.... ."); Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in
Contract Remedies, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 176 (1996) (explaining that "avoidable
consequences doctrine" disallows plaintiffs from recovering for damages that they could
have reasonably prevented).
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work around the other people.
One problem in determining this value is how does the owner
know that if the painter had actually had the room to himself it
would not have taken for example twelve hours to complete the
work representing only three hours (15-12=3) of additional work
due exclusively to the presence of the other workers? The twelve
hours here would represent the "ideal contract price"39 for this
contractor, and it is important to know because the contractor is
not allowed to turn a losing contract into a winning one. To say
this another way, if the painter had mistakenly bid a price
representing eight hours of work when the painter should have
bid a price representing twelve hours of work, the painter is not
allowed to use the owner's breach to make up the difference; that
difference being what the painter will lose by his own fault of
underbidding.
A second problem is even if the painter had just finished
painting ten rooms that were each the same size and shape and
each of those only took eight hours it would still not end the
dilemma, for the owner would still not know if the presence of the
other workers, while causing seven hours (15-8=7) of additional
work for this painter, may have only caused for example four
extra hours for the "average painter." How does the owner know
that it is not dealing with a painter who is exceptionally slow
around other people? Is it fair to the owner to have to pay for
seven additional hours of work when the "average painter" would
have only charged an additional four hours of work?
The problem is that only one room was actually painted here,
so no one knows how much time it would have taken the "average
painter" to paint the room with and without the presence of the
other workers. To obtain the "ideal time" for the "average
painter" the owner would have to hire ten other painters and
have them paint the room under circumstances of similar
interference to obtain the "ideal cost with interference." Also, the
"ideal contract price" for the "average painter" painting the room
as intended would need to be determined, meaning ten painters
39 "Ideal contract price" being the price it would have cost the contractor to perform
the work had the owner not breached the contract by making performance more difficult.
Since this "ideal contract price" is often impossible to determine, courts will use the
.reasonable contract price"; often measure by the average of the bids received for the job.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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would have to be hired to paint the room with no one else present
in order to determine the ideal time of performance as originally
planned to get the "ideal contract price." Once the "ideal contract
price" is known and the "ideal actual cost" is known, the effect of
exclusively the presence of the other workers on performance of
the contract can be determined to near certainty (ideal "actual
cost" minus ideal "contract price" equals cost of "extra work,"
where "actual cost" equals the total cost of performance). 40 But to
do all this just to get an accurate damage claim would be akin to
spending one hundred dollars to get back one dollar; this leaves
all involved in the realm of the unknown. Therefore no practical
independent method exists to measure the value of exclusively
the "extra work" other than what this painter says is the cost of
the "extra work," and the painter's only method to value that cost
is by claiming the difference between his total cost of
performance and the contract price. This problem of uncertainty
as to the damages is what courts face when deciding whether to
allow a party to use the "total cost" method rather than force a
damage claim to be dismissed as speculative, and when courts do
use it they go out on a limb with respect to the reasonableness of
both the contractor's "actual cost" and its "contract price."41
Satisfaction of the four-prong test though mitigates the risk of an
inaccurate valuation of this "extra work."42
"Total Cost- Example
The "total cost" method forces the courts to balance the owner's
40 See generally Azure v. United States, No. 96-5054, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at
*6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) (stating that "total cost" method awards contractor difference
between total costs and contractor's bid); Ralph L. Jones Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl.
327, 331-32 (1995) (commenting that contractor possesses burden of proving that
increased costs arose from additional work); Glasgow, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of
Transp., 529 A.2d 576, 579 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (stating that under "total cost"
method, damages are calculated by subtracting estimated costs from actual rosts).
41 As will be discussed later the ideal contract price can be determined to the
satisfaction of the court by comparing it to other bids for the same job. See infra Part III,
Sec. C.
42 See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik Constr., Inc. & Assoc., 795 P.2d 793, 798-
99 (Alaska 1990), vacated in part on reh'g, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991) (stating that "total
cost" method assumes plaintiffs contract costs were reasonable and that plaintiff was not
responsible for any increases in cost, both of which are not always accurate assumptions);
see also Larry Armbruster & Sons, Inc. v. State Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth., 505 A.2d 395, 397
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (advising caution with use of "total cost" method because
determining damages accurately under method is difficult). See generally J.D. Hedin
Constr. Co. v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 70, 86 (1965) (admitting that "total cost" method
is used only when there is no other alternative way to prove damages).
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concern regarding a run-away damage claim, with the right of
the contractor to relief.43 Courts are satisfied that the proper
balance is met when the applicable four-prong safeguards are
satisfied.4 At the same time this test satisfies the certainty
requirement for proof of damages.45 In the long run this balance
should work to the benefit of both parties because as one court
noted: "This will ensure that future contractors are willing to bid
at the lowest possible price while providing the highest possible
quality by preventing bidders from increasing their bid prices to
protect against misfortunes resulting from unforeseen
developments. "46
Another note of terminology needs to be made here regarding
the term "bid." Instead of reasonable "contract price" in the
second prong of the "total cost" method many courts use the term
"bid" or "estimate."47 Since the estimate for the job includes the
estimated cost of performance, plus profits and overhead, this
estimate then becomes the bid price and if the contractor wins
the job the bid price then becomes the contract price. When
courts look at the reasonableness of the "contract price" they
have to look at what the "contract price" is based on, which is the
bid or the estimate, so many times the term "bid" or "estimate" is
43 See Hedin, 171 Ct. Cl. at 86-87 (condoning use of "total cost" where no alternative
means of measuring damages exists); see also Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986) (taking note of appellant's contention that "total
cost' method is not well defined, but it typically involves a comparison of the bid amount
and actual costs"); McKie v. Huntley, 2000 SD 160, P22 (2000) (opining: "Once liability is
established by a preponderance of the evidence, the total cost method of calculating
damages may be appropriate for those disputes where it is difficult or impractical to
quantify losses from changed conditions").
44 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting "total cost" four-part test must be met to show damages); Youngdale & Sons
Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 541 (1993) (describing four-part test as
prerequisite for recovery under "total cost" theory); WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct.
Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (enumerating four-part test which requires impracticality of proof,
reasonable bid, actual cost, and owner fault).
45 See Hedin, 171 Ct. Cl. at 86 (recognizing "that the lack of certainty as to the
amount of damages should not preclude recovery" and finding that in cases where
.responsibility for damages was clearly established" and "there is no other alternative,"
use of "total cost" method, "under proper safeguards" allows for "comput[ation of]
reasonable damages where no other method was available"); see also Bagwell, 797 F.2d at
1307 (accepting "total cost" when alternate methods are unavailable).
46 Jack L. Olsen, Inc. v. Espy, No. 93-1324, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11840, at *8 (Fed.
Cir. May 19, 1994).
47 See Hedin, 171 Ct. Cl. at 87 (noting: "The closeness of the bids gives support to the
reasonableness of the estimate"); see also Servidone 931 F.2d at 861 (stating second prong
requires "reasonableness of bid"); McK"e 2000 SD 160 at P22 (pointing out second prong
requirement that "bid or estimate was realistic").
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used.48
How the required four elements are used can be illustrated by
the following example that deals with the common problem of a
differing site condition.
Assume a contractor bids an excavation job for $2 million,
basing its bid on the soil condition shown in the contract
documents. Assume when the contractor wins the job it turns
out that the soil is much different than expected because the soil
contains intermittent boulders when it was supposed to be pure
sand. Now suppose the contractor's overall cost ("actual cost as
total cost of performance") to excavate the soil with the boulders
is $3 million. If the contractor's interpretation of the contract
documents was reasonable, meaning it was entitled to expect
pure sand, then the contractor will win on the merits of its claim
for an equitable adjustment due to a differing site condition. The
next step is to prove the quantum of damages. In this example,
assume the presence of the boulders in the soil resulted in a loss
of productivity so where one dump truck could be loaded every
hour with the expected soil it now took an average of an hour and
a half to load one truck. This loss of productivity may be hard to
document because the contractor is slowed down by the need to
remove the boulders at random intervals,49 so as a practical
matter for this example let us assume that documenting the loss
of productivity is not possible.50
48 See Baldi Bros. Constrs. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 74, 79 (2001) (stating that
under "total cost" method, court assumes that original bid price reasonably reflected cost
to perform under contract); see also Cavalier Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl.
399, 421-22 (2001) (discussing reasonableness of bidding price to recover under "total
cost" method); Biemann & Rowell Co. v. Donohoe Cos. Inc., 556 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (using term "bid" in "total cost" method analysis).
49 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., No. 93-CV-4750, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627, at *267 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998) (stating "Under the 'measured
mile' approach, claimant compares the costs of installing work not subject to delay or
impact with the costs of installing similar work during the period subject to the alleged
impact"); see also J. Avery Kirst, Jr., FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.27
Inefficiency or Loss of Productivity (1999) (determining normal production rate by using
"measured mile" approach); Theodore J. Trauner & Angela M. Sist, Identiying, Proving
and Quantifying Damages, 425 PLREAL 167, 182 (1998) (stating that "measured mile"
approach is "preferred" method when measuring inefficiency).
50 See Thomas E. Shea, Searching for the Standard of Productivity: Loss of Efflciency
Damages in Construction Cases, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 225 (1988) (noting that "complex
loss of productivity claims often sneak up on a contractor"); see also Patton & Gatlin,
supra note 6, at 21 (stating that contractor must quantify, with reasonable accuracy,
amount of damages due to owner); Trauner & Sist, supra note 49, at 182 (commenting
that plaintiff can establish such proof of damages by use of daily work reports, payroll
records and schedule updates).
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Under the "total cost" method of calculating damages, the $3
million total cost of performance (actual cost) will be subtracted
from the $2 million contract price to obtain a damage claim of $1
million. For a court to award this amount the contractor must
satisfy the four prong safeguards of the "total cost" method. 51
These are analyzed as follows: The first prong requires that no
alternative methods exist for measuring damages other than by
taking the contractor's claimed actual cost and subtracting it
from the contract price. 52 In this example the cost of performance
is not like the sale of goods, where changes can be accounted for
with certainty. The soil here contains intermittent boulders,
meaning no industry "estimate book" will give the value of the
work because the number of boulders will be randomly
encountered, and additionally no means exist to segregate out
the cost for purely the "extra work." Therefore, the first prong of
the "total cost" is satisfied because no alternate method exists for
determining the value of the "extra work." The second prong
requires that the original estimate must be reasonable. 53 The
original estimate can be compared to other estimates that the
owner received and the owner's own estimate; the contractor's
estimate can also be checked for mistakes and any deficiencies
can be adjusted for in the calculations; therefore, after all
adjustments are made to the bid price the second prong is
satisfied. The third prong requires the actual cost to be
reasonable. 54 The contractor can adjust its cost accordingly to
51 See Reginald M. Jones, Lost Productivity: Claims for the Cumulative Impact of
Multiple Change Orders, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 31 (2001) (delineating four-part test of
"total cost" method: 1) proving actual losses directly is impractical; 2) reasonableness of
bid ; 3) reasonableness of project's actual costs; and 4) contractor's lack of responsibility
for added costs); see also Raytheon Co. v. White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting in examining cases, that four-part test ensures, to extent possible, burden of
paying excess expenditure falls on responsible party); Amelco Elec. v. Thousand Oaks, 38
P.3d 1120, 1129 (Cal. 2002) (stating that contractor must satisfy four prongs of "total cost"
method test).
52 See Jones, supra note 51, at 31 (highlighting that under first prong, no other
methods are practicable in determining damages); see also Raytheon, 305 F.3d at 1366
(observing that nature of losses make it impossible or impractical to quantify them with
reasonable accuracy); Amelco, 38 P.3d at 1129 (stating that proving losses directly is
impractical).
53 See WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (noting that
contractor's bid estimate must have been realistic); see also Raytheon, 305 F.3d at 1366
(commenting bid estimate must be realistic); Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States,
931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (pointing out bid's reasonableness is second factor).
54 See Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1309 (5th Cir.
1986) (discussing third prong of "total cost" method).
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satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. If for example the
contractor used the wrong equipment at first, the contractor will
have to subtract such costs due to its own fault from the actual
cost. After all adjustments are made to the actual cost and the
amount is deemed reasonable based on expert opinion, then the
third prong is satisfied. The fourth prong requires that the
contractor is not responsible for the extra cost.55 This is satisfied
once the contractor wins on the merits of its underlying claim
and proves its interpretation of the contract's soils provision was
reasonable. When all four prongs are satisfied the courts will
allow the "total cost" damage claim over the objections of the
owner that the damages are uncertain.56
To determine the fairness of this method to the owner, one
must look at the drawbacks to the contractor. First the
contractor legitimately performed "extra work" and had to fight
its way through a court trial just to win on the merits of the
claim; therefore, at this point fairness would dictate that the
contractor not go home empty handed. In addition, the "total
cost" does not even protect the benefit of the bargain for the
contractor. Consider the contractor who went into the job with a
winning plan that would have yielded a generous profit; not only
does the contractor lose any benefits of being able to perform the
original work in an efficient and profitable manner, it will lose
the benefit of performing the "extra work" in a highly efficient
manner.
Take the example above. Assume the contractor was the low
bidder at $2 million. Now assume the contractor had also just
performed several similar jobs and so had learned to perform the
task in a highly efficient manner, plus it has an experienced
labor crew and all the proper machinery readily available. If the
site conditions are as planned it is not unreasonable to assume
55 SeeAmelco, 38 P.3d at 1129 (stating that requirement of test is that contractor not
be responsible for added cost); see also Raytheon, 305 F.3d at 1366 (agreeing that
contractor not be responsible for added cost as fourth part of test); Servidone, 931 F.2d at
861 (applying fourth prong, contractor's lack of responsibility, as requirement).
56 See Howard M. Turner et al., Trial Practice. Proof of Selected Issues, in ILL. INST.
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDIUC. § 9.4 Delay Claims by the Contractor (2000) (stating that
premise of "total cost" method is that defendant should not be relieved from liability
merely because contractor cannot prove damages to exact certainty); see also Sobel, supra
note 6, at 7 (claiming that accepted bid is some proof of reasonableness). See generally
Aaen supra note 1, at 1202 (finding that this requirement works most clearly in two-party
contracts and can break down in complex contracts involving multiple contractors and
subcontractors).
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the work can be performed for $1.5 million dollars, representing
a profit of $500,000; much more than the roughly standard 10
percent profit margin on a cost-plus job. But assume the
contractor experiences a differing soil condition as in the example
above. Assume as a result of the differing soil conditions the
total cost of performance under the changed conditions for this
experienced contractor is $2.2 million, including a 10 percent
profit margin; but now consider that for an average contractor
who lacks the special experience to perform the contract and the
"extra work" so efficiently, its total cost of performance may be $3
million. Under the "total cost" method the efficient contractor at
best will see a profit of only $220,000 (10% of $2.2 million),
representing a standard "time and materials" or "cost-plus" profit
margin of around 10 percent; meanwhile the inefficient
contractor can make a "total cost" claim of $1 million ($3 million
minus $2 million equals $1 million, with a 10% profit margin
equaling $300,000). The efficient contractor loses the benefit of
the bargain, namely the chance to use its experience to achieve a
25 percent profit margin of $500,000. On top of this consider that
the efficient contractor in such a situation actually has no
incentive to perform the "extra work" in an efficient manner
because the cheaper it performs the work the less money it will
make - it is forced into a cost-plus situation with a profit margin
capped at 10%. An even more extreme case occurs when the
contractor performs "extra work" but its total cost does not
exceed the contract price. There may be no adequate solution to
this dilemma of lost profits;57 it only exposes yet another
minefield in the never-ending drama of owner versus contractor.
Another point needs to be made regarding "total cost" in
relation to complex multi task projects. In the examples
presented above, where the owner's breach only affects one item
of work, for example, painting or excavation, courts will more
easily accept a damage claim using "total cost" and find the "total
cost" safeguards easily met.5 8 But the "total cost" method itself
becomes more difficult to accept on larger and more complex
57 See McKie v. Huntley, 2000 SD 160, P13-15 (2000) (discussing "breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent tort" and its relation to
"efficient breach principle").
58 Aaen, supra note 1, at 1188 (stating: "Since the late 1970s, the courts have
generally accepted the total cost method where the four part test has been met.").
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multi task projects where many areas of the project are affected
by the owner's breach. It seems that the "total cost" safeguards
as applied to these situations may not yield acceptable results
because it is difficult to pinpoint the cause and effect nature of
the breach and the damages;59 this has created a reluctance by
courts to accept the "total cost" method itself for all situations
whether or not the project is a single task job or a multitask job.
These types of claims on complex multi task projects have been
termed "ripple effect" claims because the owner's breach has a
ripple effect on all the individual tasks taking place. 60 A ripple
effect claim affects the way courts view "total cost." The first
prong is still satisfied because no independent means of
measuring damages exists. The second prong also stays the
same because here the "reasonableness of the bid" is easily
satisfied if other bids exist. However the third prong relating to
the reasonableness of the actual cost and the fourth prong of the
lack of the contractor's fault become more problematic. When the
owner's breach has an effect on multiple aspects of the project
that lead to a general loss of productivity creating a "ripple
effect" on all project tasks, in order to truly show proof of
damages the contractor would have to show its loss individually
on each one of its maybe hundreds or even thousands of tasks,
unfortunately this is next to impossible.61
To highlight this problem take for example the building of a
subway station. Assume the owner wrongfully accelerates the
59 See Wolff & Munier, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 946 F.2d 1003, 1010
(2d Cir. 1991) (noting "New York law does not countenance damage awards based on
'speculation or conjecture'"); Fattore Co. v. Metro. Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee, 505
F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931) (commenting on rule precluding recovery which refers to
damages that "are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are
definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount" and
stating "it will be enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of
just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate").
60 See DONALD BARRIE & BOYD PAULSON, PROFESSIONAL CONSTRUCTION
MANAGEMENT 467 (3d ed. 1992) (stating that "ripple effect claims represent the most
difficult claims to adjudicate... [and] the resultant effect of the delays on the upon the
work can be subject to considerable disagreement."); Sobel, supra note 6, at 5 (analogizing
"individual impacts to a construction project" to a "stone that causes the waves on a
pond," however pointing out that "in most construction projects, the pond is not perfectly
round, and many stones of different sizes are dropped and thrown randomly and
repeatedly from different sources, at different angles, and at different times into a pond
whose surface is being whipped by swirling winds, landing geese, and diving frogs").
61 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., No. 93-CV-4750, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627, at *258 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998) (describing effect acceleration
has on costs and loss of productivity); Sobel, supra note 6, at 5.
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project and does not administer the contract properly thus
creating delays and inefficiencies for the contractor.62 Here the
building of a subway station includes thousands of detailed
tasks,63 these can be grouped into categories such as excavation
of soil, support of excavation, relocation of utilities, temporary
decking, foundation concrete, forming the subway walls, pouring
concrete for the walls, forming the roof, pouring concrete for the
roof, street restoration, etc, with each of these having their own
many smaller tasks which add up to create thousands of small
tasks. On such a multi task project, with thousands of tasks, if
the contractor thinks the owner has hurt its productivity, it
becomes very problematic to show direct proof of how each one of
the thousand of tasks was affected and its attendant quantum of
increased cost - each of the thousand tasks would have to
become a separate claim. 64 Since it is not practical to measure
loss on each of the thousands of individual tasks, 65 the contractor
often comes to court with only its quantum of damages based on
the overall cost for the entire job; basically saying to the court:
"These are my actual costs, this was my bid, now I would like the
difference please." In these types of cases use of the "total cost"
method is most "suspect" because even the safeguards provide
little comfort against the possibility that the contractor's own
inefficiency in performing its many tasks may have caused some
part of the increased cost. In this case, the concern that using the
"total cost" method "wrongfully assumes" that the contractor
"flawlessly performed its work" is more of a concern for courts
than when one task is performed, because an owner can
determine if the contractor's total cost of performance is
62 For an example of such a case see Mergentime Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408.
63 See Mergentime Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 89-1055 (HHG),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *16 (D.D.C. July 22, 1997) (listing activities involved in
subway station construction); see also East 63rd St. Ass'n v. Coleman, 414 F. Supp. 1318,
1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (reciting actions that were taken in construction of subway station).
64 See Patton & Gatlin, supra note 6, at 21 (suggesting that proving loss of
productivity damages to required certainty is difficult task); see also Performance
Abatement Servs. Inc. v. Lansing Bd. of Water & Light, 168 F. Supp. 2d 720, 741 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (intimating that loss of productivity damages must be pled and proven);
Walter Kidde Constructors, Inc. v. Conn., 434 A.2d 962, 977-78 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981)
(noting that for loss of productivity damages, contractor "carefully followed the method of
proof expressly approved").
65 See Luria Brothers & Co. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 676, 696 (1966) (commenting
that loss of productivity cannot be proven merely by books and records); Williams v.
Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 581 (Kan. 1962) (indicating that loss of productivity claims are
complex and long-term).
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reasonable more precisely when one task is performed than when
hundreds of tasks are performed; the greater the number of
tasks, the harder it will be for an owner to determine if each task
was performed within a reasonable cost or even if the net effect of
all the tasks results in a reasonable cost.66 In response, the
contractor will be forced to argue that when the owner's breach is
clear, some measure of damages is warranted; and that the
safeguards provided by the "total cost" method still ensure some
fair measure of reasonableness to the claim.
Unfortunately, in these ripple effect cases the courts seem to
wrongfully focus their negativity on the "total cost" method itself,
as if in every case a "total cost" claim is suspect, instead of
focusing on the real issue in "ripple effect" which is the difficulty
of proving causation. "The total cost method is not a substitute
for proof of causation but rather a method for calculating the
amount of damages."67 For a contractor who suffers such a ripple
effect claim no easy answers exist. The only suggestions are
preventative ones. Contractors should try and discover if an
owner's past course of dealings with other contractors have led to
problems and factor in a contingency if warranted. Contractors
should also make a general evaluation of the quality of the
contract drawings, this can be accomplished as the bid is
prepared from those drawings, and then factor in a contingency if
the contractor feels the drawings are less than complete.
Alternative Methods of Proving Damages
There are actually three main ways in which courts measure
damages regarding construction contract disputes: the "actual
cost" method, the "total cost" method, and the "jury verdict"
method.68 Basically these are not so much methods of proof as
66 See McKie v. Huntley, 2000 SD 160, P21 (2000) (quoting WILLIAM SCHWARTZKOPF
ET AL., CALCULATING CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES § 1.6 (1997 Supp.)); see also Raytheon Co.
v. White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (remarking that performance
inefficiencies can inflate contractor's cost under "total cost" method); Youngdale & Sons
Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 541 (1993) (noting overall consensus that
"[ulse of ['total cost'] method is highly disfavored by the courts, because it blandly
assumes - that every penney of the plaintiffs costs are prima facie reasonable, that the
bid was accurately and reasonably computed, and that the plaintiff is not responsible for
any increases in cost").
67 Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190-91.
68 See Azure v. United States, No. 96-5054, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *15-16
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) (noting that three methods of damage calculation exist: "actual
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they are characterizations of the evidence. The line demarcating
these characterizations is not always clear, and the level of
documentation that the contractor or owner can produce on the
costs of the "extra work" along with any independent proof of
damages will control where on the spectrum the evidence is
characterized.
Care needs to be taken to avoid confusion here, "actual cost" as
a particular method of proving damages is distinct from actual
cost as used in the third prong of the "total cost" method to
represent the total cost of performance.
Ideally the "actual cost" method is based on full documentation
of the expenses of purely the "extra work" along with an
independent means of evaluating the reasonableness of those
expenses. It is considered the most precise method of calculating
damages, and as such is most preferred by the courts, with the
"jury verdict" method least preferred, and the "total cost" method
somewhere in the middle.69 Whether the case will proceed on this
method or the "total cost" method is a threshold question
answered by the outcome of the first prong of the "total cost"
method - that no alternative methods exist for measuring
damages.70 Here the owner may claim it can calculate damages
by an "actual cost" method that results in lower damages than
the contractor's claim using the "total cost" method, while the
contractor will argue the reverse that its claim is actually an
"actual cost" claim and not a "total cost" calculation.7'
cost" method, "total cost" method, and "jury verdict"); Jack L. Olsen, Inc. v. Espy, No. 93-
1324, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11840, at *4-6 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 1994) (discussing use of
three alternate methods of damage calculation); Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23408, at *4-6 (positing three alternatives to calculation of damages "actual cost" method,
"total cost" method, and "jury verdict").
69 See Azure, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *15-16 (noting "actual cost" method
most preferred because of detailed documentation); Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States,
930 F.2d 872, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating preference for "actual cost" method because it
accurately documents costs); Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *6-7 (arguing
preference for "actual cost" method where applicable).
70 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., No. 93-CV-4750, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627, at *256-57 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998) (listing two considerations
used in conjunction with first prong as "direct cost of performing the changed work itself
and "cost impact of the changes on the unchanged work"); Cavalier Clothes, Inc. v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 399, 418 (2001) (interpreting first prong to mean that contractor must
"demonstrate that proving actual losses is impossible or highly impractical"); WRB Corp.
v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (noting first prong of four-prong test for
determining whether to use "total cost" method).
71 See Dawco, 930 F.2d at 876 (commenting: "Claims Court adopted the 'jury verdict
method,'... [and] concluded that Dawco was unable, despite Edmunson's testimony, to
'prove actual damages'... "); see also Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *6
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For example, in Mergentime Corp. v. WMATA,72 a contractor
was hired to construct a $100 million dollar subway complex.
The contractor claimed it was owed an equitable adjustment for
multiple changes and for acceleration of the job.73 In response to
the contractor's request to use either the "total cost" method, or
the "jury verdict" method, the court said those methods would not
be appropriate "in this case because there is a more reliable
means of proving damages: direct or 'actual costs,' based upon
expert testimony, contemporaneous records, and [the owner's]
cost audits."74 The court also declined to accept the contractor's
damage claim as "actual cost," stating: "Although Mergentime
labels its methodology 'documented/actual cost,' not all of its
computations meet the standard for the 'actual cost' method."75 It
quoted from another decision the standard for "actual cost" proof
as: "The 'actual cost' method ... requires the contractor to
submit... detailed documentation regarding the 'extra' costs it
incurred due to modification in performance... The method
requires cumbersome segregation of those costs incurred due to
the original contractual obligations from those associated with
the modification."76 The court then proceeded to measure
damages according to the owner's calculation of damages, finding
"the testimony of [owner's] expert ... to be the most reliable
evidence of the direct costs incurred . . ."77
The final and least favored way courts measure damages is the
"jury verdict" method and as the name says the trier of fact
(discussing dispute over how to categorize damage claim); Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio
Constr. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 326 (Alaska 1992) (noting: "Before a contractor may rely on a
total cost method, it must show that such a method is the only one available under the
circumstances" and that defendant "points out that its own expert was able to make an
actual cost estimation of damages ... [and that plaintiff] made no attempt to relate its
claim for specific increased costs. . . to the differing site condition").
72 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408.
73 Id. at *8-12 (discussing basis for dispute); see also Mergentime Corp. v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 775 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining terms of
contracts and foundations of claims). See generally Zahran v. Cleary Bldg. Corp., Nos. 97-
3813 & 98-2122, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14103, at *7 (7th Cir. June 1, 1999), cert. denied,
No. 99-1237, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 1950 (March 20, 2000) (reviewing procedural history of
Mergentime).
74 Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *6 (explaining that "actual cost"
method was applicable because of sufficient testimonial evidence available in case
regarding specific costs incurred).
75 Id. (stating "actual cost" method was inapplicable to contractor's damage claim
notwithstanding its definition as such by plaintiff contractor).
76 Id.
77 Id. at "14-15.
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decides the damages.78 The "jury verdict" method "requires the
court to arrive at a reasonable equitable adjustment after
receiving evidence from the parties,"79 and is "most often
employed when damages cannot be ascertained by any
reasonable computation from actual figures."80 As stated earlier,
it does not seem to be so much a method as it is a
characterization of the evidence. Courts seem to characterize a
damage claim as "jury verdict" when proof of damages are least
certain; one court referred to it as the "guesstimate" method.81
Courts allow such a method when clear proof of fault exists but
the amount is not certain; such relief seems to be a matter of
fairness so as not to deny to a party clearly injured some
reasonable compensation. As with the "total cost" method, it is
used when the more preferred "actual cost" method is not
available, and seems to be used when issues of apportionment of
fault exist that cannot be fully resolved by the use of "total cost"
method. 82 The courts have developed a three prong test for when
it is appropriate to use the "jury verdict" method, 1) when clear
proof of injury exists, 2) when there is no more reliable method
for computing damages; and 3) when the evidence is sufficient for
a court to make a fair and reasonable approximation of the
damages.8 3 Of the three methods for calculating damages, courts
are most concerned with the "jury verdict" method because as one
court put it: "Its primary peril, as evidenced in this case, is the
risk that unrealistic assumptions will be adopted and
extrapolated, greatly multiplying an award beyond reason, and
78 See Jack L. Olsen, Inc. v. Espy, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11840, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(stating preference for modified "total cost" over "jury verdict" method); see also Azure v.
United States, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *16 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) ("The third
method - the 'jury verdict' method - requires the court to arrive at a reasonable equitable
adjustment after receiving evidence from the parties."); Aaen, supra note 1, at 1189
(describing "jury verdict" method of proving damages).
79 Azure, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *16.
80 Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
81 Dawco, 930 F.2d at 881.
82 See Olsen, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11840, at *8 (asserting that "jury verdict" method
should be reserved for when modified "total cost" is not applicable); see also Azure, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *18-20 (discussing difficulty in measuring damages).
83 WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 425 (1968) ("[W]e have allowed so-
called 'jury verdicts' if there was clear proof that the contractor was injured and there was
no more reliable method for computing damages - but only where 'the evidence adduced
[was] sufficient to enable a court or jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation."');
Dawco, 930 F.2d at 882 (stating three prong test for "jury verdict" method developed from
WRB); Azure, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365, at *16 (noting three prong test for "jury
verdict" as stated in Dawco).
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rewarding preparers of imprecise claims based on undocumented
costs with unjustified windfalls."84
For example, in Azure v. United States,85 the contractor was
hired for construction of an erosion control works. 86 Working
through the three prongs, the court found first, that "clear proof
of injury exists."87 Second, it found it impossible to directly
measure the cost because "the adverse weather conditions during
the extended period in which the excavations remained open
caused a myriad of problems... [and the] extreme muddy
conditions caused difficulties and slowed down performance."88
Third, it found a reasonable approximation could be made
between the two extremes that represent the calculated damages
so as to justify the use of the "jury verdict" method; the two
extremes were $1,616 and $18,904.89
Comparison with Restitution Claims
Restitution, as measured in value by quantum meruit,
meaning "as much as is merited,"90 entitles a party, in an
implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract, to recover the
"reasonable value" of its services to avoid unjust enrichment. 91 To
measure the value one court stated:
The measure of recovery for quantum meruit is the
reasonable value of the performance; and recovery is
undiminished by any loss which would have been incurred
by complete performance... [Tihe standard for measuring
the reasonable value of the services rendered is the amount
for which such services could have been purchased from one
in the plaintiff's position at the time and place the services
84 Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *5.
85 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
86 Id. at *1.
87 Id. at *17.
88 Id. at *18.
89 Id. at *20.
90 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 576 (7th ed. 1999).
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981) (stating: "If a sum of
money is awarded to protect a party's restitution interest, it may as justice requires be
measured by ... the reasonable value to the other party of what he received"); see also
Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Wil: The
True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 103 (1996) (explaining
quantum meruit as "a theory designed to allow recovery for unjust enrichment in cases
where no contract existed between the parties"); Kovacic, supra note 27, at 553 (pointing
out quantum meruit's application in quasi-contracts).
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were rendered. 92
Generally restitution is reserved for a material breach of the
contract that in effect rescinds the original contract or when no
contract exists at all. By contrast "total cost" is used for recovery
under the contract when the contract is fully performed. Like
restitution the "total cost" method has a similar "reasonableness"
standard for measuring its quantum of the damages requiring
both the "actual cost" and the bid to be "reasonable." Generally
the same issues of proof arise for both restitution recovery and
"total cost," and in both cases courts find themselves taking a
hard look at complex facts to insure certainty and apportionment
of fault. 93
For example, in Northeast Drilling, Inc. v. Inner Space
Services,94 an underwater dredging and construction project,95
disputes arose over the quality of the work and the resulting
damages. 96 The court commented that the facts of the underlying
claims were difficult to sort out due to the nature of underwater
dredging, and further noted that this task was made more
arduous by expert testimony at polar extremes. 97 It commented
that defendant's proof of its counterclaim "rests on an unrealistic
and unjustified premise as to what equipment... [defendant]
needed for dredging, and it fails to account for other factors - for
which... [plaintiff] was not responsible - that contributed to the
damage."98 The court stated that proof is not required to a
mathematical certainty,99  thus illustrating that issues of
92 United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
93 See generally Galligan, supra note 1, at 809-10 (arguing courts grant restitution
recovery in construction cases primarily based on plaintiffs estimated losses rather than
on defendant's actual gains); Aaen supra note 1, at 1186 (noting complexity and variety of
factors involved in construction cases that lead to difficulty in determining actual costs);
Patton & Gatlin, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing "special factors" courts will consider in
applying "total cost" method to determine recovery in construction cases).
94 No. 99-173-P-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20254 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2000).
95 Id. at *1-11 (outlining background, scope and performance of contract).
96 Id. at *8-12 (describing issues in dispute).
97 Id. at *21-23 (stating: "Calculation of damages and proof of causation here are
complex" and that "it is a factfmder's conclusion of what the approximately correct
number is when the parties have presented damage numbers at the polar extremes in a
factual setting of great uncertainty and difficulties of proof (Ue., what happened
underwater and why")).
98 Id. at *21 n.9 (referencing Findings of Fact).
99 Id. at *23 n.10 (quoting Down E. Energy Corp. v. RMR, Inc., 1997 ME 148, P7
(1997) (holding that "reasonableness, not mathematical certainty, is the criterion for
determining whether damages were awarded appropriately").
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certainty and apportionment of fault are the same for restitution
claims as they are for those under the "total cost" method.
Another issue is whether the "total cost" method is reserved
only for damages under the contract as opposed to restitutionary
relief for unjust enrichment. If the contract is rescinded,
abandoned, or the owner is found to have materially breached
the contract, then the non-breaching party recovers the quantum
meruit of its work and is not limited by the contract, so no matter
how low the original estimate, all that has to be proven is that
the actual costs are reasonable, and no consideration is given to
how much unintended gain the contractor receives. 100 Under
"total cost" by contrast, the bid is normally adjusted upwards to
avoid turning a losing contract into a winning one. In C. Norman
Peterson v. Container Corp. of America,10 the court concluded
that the plaintiff was "entitled to recover the unpaid reasonable
costs of its work" under quantum meruit because of
abandonment of the contract, 02 and stated that: "Under the facts
of this case, it was appropriate for the trial court to award
damages based on the total cost method."103 The court used "total
cost" to determine quantum meruit noticing it is just another
way of obtaining the "reasonable value" of the work.104 In
addition, in the context of "extra work," recent courts have stated
that although normally quantum meruit is reserved for cases
with no express contract, recovery on a quantum meruit basis is
acceptable when "extra work" is performed outside the scope of
the express contract. 0 5
100 Aaen, supra note 1, 1193 (describing that in abandonment situation "[n]o need
exists to show the accuracy of the original estimate since there is no contract or bargain
under which the parties are entitled to benefit").
101 172 Cal. App. 3d 628 (1985).
102 Id. at 645.
103 Id. at 647.
104 See Id.; Aaen, supra note 1, 1193 ("Absent other factors, the total cost, including
overhead and profit, is usually accepted as the reasonable value of the work.").
los See BB&B Constr., Inc. v. Hogan, Nos. 99-7142 & 00-7015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
18706, at *4 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001) (stating: "[A] contract does not necessarily bar the
pursuit of a quantum meruit claim, [and] [rielief under a quantum meruit theory may be
permitted as long as it involves obligations outside the scope of the express contract"); see
also ABC Elec., Inc. v. Neb. Beef, Ltd., 249 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A] quantum
meruit claim may supplement an express contract by seeking reasonable compensation
for work not covered by the contract"); United States ex el. Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc.,
v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing N. Am. Graphite Corp. v.
Allan, 184 F.2d 387, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1950)); 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1469 (3d ed.
1970) ("A plaintiff may join a claim for quantum meruit with a claim for damages from
breach of contract"); Galligan, supra note 1, at 803 (remarking: "Courts use implied
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Certainty Requirement
Common contract doctrine states that damages cannot be
speculative, 0 6 but at the same time, damages do not have to be
proven to a mathematical exactitude.107 The United States
Supreme Court recognized the limitations on proving damages in
its 1927 ruling in Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern
Photo Materials Co.10 8  This anti-trust case involved a
photographic company, Southern Photo Materials ("Southern"),
that suffered lost profits when it refused to sell the part of its
business that competed with Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak") to
Kodak.109 Kodak was trying to monopolize the industry, and
contract and restitution in manners that defy their traditional definitions, suggesting that
such use of doctrine is one of the malleable tools that neoclassical courts have employed to
satisfy the need for flexibility in complex contractual relationships").
106 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (stating: "Damages are
not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established
with reasonable certainty"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981)
("determining whether the remedy in damages would be adequate" by considering "the
difficulty of proving damages with reasonable certainty, the difficulty of procuring a
suitable substitute performance by means of money awarded as damages, and the
likelihood that an award of damages could not be collected").
107 See Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 369 (1927)
(citing Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 169 U.S. 26, 39 (1898) (noting "defendant whose
wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages suffered
by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the same
exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible")); see also N.E. Drilling, Inc. v.
Inner Space Servs., No. 99-173-P-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20254, at *23 n.10 (D.C. Me.
Mar. 31, 2000) (quoting Down E. Energy Corp. v. RMR, Inc., 1997 ME 148, P7 (1997)
(stating: "The Maine Law Court has 'made clear... that reasonableness, not
mathematical certainty, is the criterion for determining whether damages were awarded
appropriately'")); Mergentime Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 89-1055
(HHG), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *7 (D.D.C. July 22, 1997) (proposing that
damages need not be proven to mathematical certainty).
108 273 U.S. 359. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and
Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065,
1089 (1986) (pointing out Court's award of treble damages in Kodak); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir. 1973) (distinguishing facts of instant case in which
plaintiff seeks consequential damages, and declining to apply liberal principles used by
Supreme Court in Kodak).
109 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 368-69 (noting plaintiffs allegations). See Eastman Kodak Co.
v. S. Photo Material Co., 295 F. 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1923), afd, 273 U.S. 359 (1927)
(commenting on defendant's exclusive production of goods and plaintiffs inability to buy
them); see also Charles N. Charnas, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive
Burden on Private Plaintiffs, 72 CAL. L. REV. 403, 403 n.3 (1984) (describing Kodak's
monopoly).
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when Southern declined to sell Kodak that part of its business
that competed with Kodak, Kodak retaliated by refusing to sell to
Southern various wholesale products at reasonable prices that
were required by Southern for other parts of its business."10
Southern claimed damages in lost profits from the sale of goods it
could no longer obtain from Kodak at a fair price.]" The only
proof of damages Southern had were "expected sales" based on
the sales from previous years.112 Kodak claimed, among other
things, that it is a mere "assumption" that such future sales as
claimed would occur.' 13 The Court disagreed, quoting the earlier
decision from the Court of Appeals: "Damages are not rendered
uncertain because they cannot be calculated with absolute
exactness. It is sufficient if a reasonable basis of computation is
afforded, although the result be only approximate."1 4 The Court
went on to state that: "[A] defendant whose wrongful conduct has
rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages
suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they
cannot be measured with the same exactness and precision as
would otherwise be possible.""15
These views were again repeated and expanded upon in the
1931 Supreme Court case of Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co.11 6 This was also an anti-trust case, and the
110 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 376 (remarking on Kodak's failure to sell to Southern).
111 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 376 (discussing Southern's lost business due to Kodak's refusal
to sell at fair price); see Kodak, 295 F. at 101 (stating Southern's claimed damages were
lost profits from particular goods); see also Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modem Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (discussing use of Southern's previous sales as basis for damage
claim).
112 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 376 (remarking Southern's basis for sales was taken from
previous years); see Kodak, 295 F. at 101 (stating Southern's method of proving damages
was their gross profit before, and immediately after, Kodak's failure to deal); see also
Blair & Harrison, supra note 111, at 5 (summarizing Southern's method "[iun calculating
damages," and noting "the plaintiff relied on a four-year period before the violation to
estimate its lost sales and then subtracted its operating costs from the gross revenue it
would have earned").
113 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 378 (explaining Kodak's assertion that these particular sales
are too speculative). See Blair & Harrison, supra note 111, at 5 (reiterating Kodak's
argument that "damages were 'purely speculative'").
114 Kodak, 273 U.S. at 379.
115 Id. (citing Hetzel v. Baltimore &Ohio R.R., 169 U.S. 26, 39 (1898)).
116 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931)
(holding "uncertainty as to the extent of the damage" does not preclude recovery). Accord
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (citing Story Parchment, 282 U.S.
at 562) (acknowledging Court has found "'clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount'")); Del. Valley Marine
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Court again had to deal with a contention that the lost profits
claimed were speculative."17 The Court of Appeals had denied
recovery, but the Supreme Court reversed, and affirmed the
judgment of the district court, noting that the standard of proof is
not the same when proving the fact of damages as it is when
proving the amount of damages.' 18
To prove the amount of damages the burden is lower because
fairness demands that an injured party receive a remedy when in
fact he is harmed.l1 9 Commenting as to proof of the amount of
damages, the Court stated: "[I1t will be enough if the evidence
shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and
reasonable inference, although the result be only
approximate."120 The Court also noted the following:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage... The
rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages
applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not
to those damages which are definitely attributable to the
Supply Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (citing Story
Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562) (analyzing process for assessment of damages and noting
Story Parchment "seemingly affirmed the rule that although the fact of damage must be
shown, without any element of uncertainty, to be definitely attributable to the wrong, a
dollar value may be assigned to an injury even if some uncertainty exists as to its
amount").
117 StoryParchment, 282 U.S. at 561-63 (refusing to "accept the view of [the Court of
Appeals] that the verdict of the jury... cannot stand because it was based upon mere
speculation and conjecture).
118 Id. at 562 (discussing difference between fact of damages and amount of damages);
see James R. McCall, The Disaggregation of Damages Requirement in Private
Monopolization Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 652 (1987) (pointing out Supreme
Court's adjustment, in Story Parchment, of "burden of proof on the issue of the amount of
damage suffered by the plaintiff' and noting that Court stated it "would be less rigorous
than the standard of proof required on the issue of whether the plaintiff sustained some
injury"); see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18
S. ILL. U. L.J. 283, 312 n.163 (1994) (remarking on Supreme Court's acknowledgment in
Story Parchment "that a precise damage calculation may be impossible and that a
plaintiff must only come forward with a just and reasonable estimate of liability once
proof of fact of injury from unlawful conduct has been established").
119 Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563 (declaring: "[Ilt would be a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts"). See Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (opining: "Any other rule would enable the
wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of his victim"): see also Roger D.
Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative"Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L. REV. 423, 425-26
(1995) (explaining: "The Supreme Court has justified the more relaxed standard for
proving the amount of damages by reasoning that the wrongdoer should bear the costs
associated with uncertainty in proving damages").
120 Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563.
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wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount. 121
This holding is in consonance with the fourth prong of the "total
cost" method which requires liability on the part of the owner
before a court will be satisfied with the contractor's claim for
damages. 122
Development of "Total Cost"
These concepts were first used to justify recovery of damages
for construction contracts starting in the 1950's. It was used
when the fact of damages was certain but the amount of the
damages was less certain, which is the classic "total cost"
example. The first case to address the issue of claiming damages
as the total cost of performance minus the contract price in the
context of a construction claim when it was difficult to measure
damages with certainty was the 1951 Court of Claims case of
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. United States.123 The case
involved a differing site condition dispute. The plaintiff was
hired to construct a river lock, and the plans did not reveal the
presence of a layer of clay in the soil. 124 As a result of the clay,
when a sheet-pile earth retaining system was installed, an
unexpected hydrostatic pressure built up because the water was
expected to drain through the supposedly sandy soil; this caused
the system to fail.125
The government's representative in charge of the contract and
in charge of processing claims for "extra work," the contracting
officer, claimed the contractor should have expected the
condition. The court found otherwise and said it was a breach of
121 Id. at 562 (citing Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129, 140-46 (1868)).
122 See WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (listing four prongs of
"total cost" method, as set forth in prior cases, including requirement of fourth prong that
plaintiff was not responsible for additional expense); see also J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v.
United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 70, 87 (1965) ("Plaintiff has established the fact that it
performed additional work [and] the responsibility of defendant for these damages is
clear, [so] [tihe only possible method by which these damages can be computed is by
resort to the 'total cost' method").
123 119 Ct. Cl. 504, 555-60 (1951) (delineating steps taken by court to calculate
damages); see Sobel, supra note 6, at 5 (noting Great Lakes was first "reported application
of the total cost measure of damages").
124 Great Lakes, 119 Ct. Cl. at 513-14 (discussing plaintiffs unexpected discovery of
clay). See also Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 233, 247-48 (1970) (commenting
Great Lakes "involved an equitable adjustment to which the court held the contractor to
be entitled as a result of a changed condition").
125 Great Lakes, 119 Ct. Cl. at 519-20 (discussing facts that led to failure of system).
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the contract not to have made an equitable adjustment under the
contract's "changed condition" clause.126 The plaintiff then
presented its extra cost as the difference between its actual costs
and its contract price, adjusting its actual costs for its own
errors. 127 In order to allow this calculation the court inquired into
whether the original contract price represented an accurate
reflection of the original as-planned costs, which the court found
it did not, concluding the contract was underestimated.128 To
overcome this the court held it "fair" to use the average of the
four other bidders along with the government's own estimate to
obtain the reasonable cost estimate for the job.129 The defendant
argued that some of the actual costs incurred were due to the
plaintiffs own inefficiencies, but the court found no evidence to
support this. 130 This was the start of the "total cost" method and
shows the outline of the method starting to take shape. It is
worthwhile to note that up until the 1970's the "total cost"
concept basically remained in the Court of Claims arena.
In the 1952 case of MacDougald Construction Co. v. United
States, 131 the issue of showing damages this way was again
presented to the court. The court relied on Great Lakes in
making its decision.132 Here a contractor was hired to construct
airfield runways; the contractor performed additional grading
work and was forced to work around airfield operations.133 The
126 Id. at 555.
127 Id at 558 (explaining plaintiffs formulation of extra costs). See Boyajian, 191 Ct.
Cl. at 247 (discussing cost determination in Great Lakes); John F. Harkins Co. v. Sch.
Dist. of Philadelphia, 460 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (detailing calculation of
damages in Great Lakes).
128 Great Lakes, 119 Ct. Cl. at 558 (disallowing cost estimate). See Boyajian, 191 Ct.
Cl. at 247 (noting how court in Great Lakes rejected plaintiffs damage determination);
Harkins, 460 A.2d at 263 (commenting on disallowance of original contract price due to
underestimation by contractor in Great Lakes).
129 Great Lakes, 119 Ct. Cl. at 559 (proposing use of four estimates as fair method of
determination). See Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516,
543 (1993) (accepting Great Lakes' rationale of using average of all losing bids); Boyajian,
191 Ct. Cl. at 247 (discussing determination of correct formula in Great Lakes).
130 Great Lakes, 119 Ct. Cl. at 558-59 (rejecting defendant's argument for lack of
evidentiary support). See generally Raytheon Co. v. White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (noting that performance inefficiencies can inflate actual expenditures); Servidone
Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that
inefficiencies in performance could inflate contractor costs).
131 122 Ct. Cl. 210 (1952).
132 Id at 261 (citing Great Lakes). See generallyT L James & Co. v. Traylor Bros Inc.,
294 F.3d 743, 754 (5th Cir. 2002); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d
1283, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 1998).
133 MacDougald, 122 Ct. Cl. at 245 (noting plaintiffs claim arises over a contract
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contractor won on the merits of the "extra work" claim, and
presented its damages as the difference between its actual cost
and its original estimate. 34 The court stated that this method
"assumes the [contractor's] original cost estimates were
correct."1 35 To account for this concern the court used an average
of twelve other bids along with the government's own estimate to
determine the reasonable contract price, and deducted that value
from the actual costs.136 The court made a note that it reviewed
the "record carefully to determine whether or not any portion of
such excess costs were attributable to circumstances which would
not entitle plaintiff to equitable adjustment. .. "137 Here again
the outline of the "total cost" method continues to be formed.
In the 1955 case of FH McGraw and Co. v. United States,138
the court showed deep concern with the use of this method.139
Here the plaintiff entered into a contract for construction of an
addition to a veterans' hospital.140 Due to changes in wage
controls at the end of World War II, combined with delays and
disruptions by the Veterans Administration, the plaintiff claimed
it was forced to suffer significant losses; the court found for the
plaintiff on the merits,141 but took issue with its method of
damage calculation. First the court stated the need to show
damages to a "reasonable certainty"; then in response to the
"whereby plaintiff agreed to furnish the material and perform the work for the clearing,
grubbing, grading, draining, and paving of runways," however, plaintiff argues that
"increased cost.., which... amounted to a change in the contract plans and
specifications" occurred and was "allegedly caused by interruptions in the work
occasioned by defendant's continued operation of the existing runways... amounting to
'unknown conditions of an unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily
encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in
the plans and specifications'").
134 Id. at 259-61 (holding "conversations summarized in the memorandum gave
assurances that the time for completing the contract work would be extended if the use of
the airfield by the military caused delays, and that any increased costs to the contractor
actually occasioned by such operations would be reimbursed" and noting that plaintiffs
claim for damages "represents the difference between plaintiffs actual costs ... and the
amounts paid by the Government").
135 Id. at 261.
136 Id. at 243 (comparing actual cost to bidding estimates of twelve other companies
and Government engineers to derive integrity of contractor's claimed costs). See generally
Cavalier Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 399, 417-18 (2001); Am. Line Builders,
Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1155, 1181 (1992).
137 MacDougald, 122 Ct. Cl. at 261.
138 131 Ct. Cl. 501 (1955).
139 Id. at 503-04.
140 Id. (detailing parties' contract involving additions to Veterans' Hospital).
141 Id. at 506 (explaining how court came to agree with plaintiffs plea).
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plaintiff relying on Great Lakes and claiming its actual cost less
its estimated cost, the court said:
This method of proving damage is by no means satisfactory,
because, among other things, [(prong 3)] it assumes
plaintiffs costs were reasonable and [(prong 4)] that plaintiff
was not responsible for any increases in cost, and [(prong 2)]
because it assumes plaintiffs bid was accurately computed,
which is not always the case, by any means. Our opinion in
Great Lakes... was not intended to give approval to this
method of proving damage, except in an extreme case and
under proper safeguards.142
This language would be repeated often in future cases. 143 The
court went on to recognize that this method was used in Great
Lakes because of the "lack of other proof."144 Here the court found
that "[(prong 1)] there is proof of these damages more reliable
than the difference in plaintiffs estimate and its actual costs."'45
The proof was the cost calculated by the contracting officer,
which the court, without going into much detail, said was "done
in the way required" and that there are no "serious" contentions
to the contrary.146 Here already we have all four basic elements
that would become the standard for the "total cost" method.
In the 1960's, the Court of Claims continued to explicate the
conditions under which this method could be used. In 1960, in
142 Id at 511.
143 See, e.g., Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 233, 249 (1970) (reiterating
McGraw court's statement that "[tihis [total cost] method of proving damage is by no
means satisfactory, because, among other things, it assumes plaintiffs costs were
reasonable and that plaintiff was not responsible for any increases in cost, and because it
assumes plaintiffs bid was accurately computed, which is not always the case, by any
means" and further pointing out court's cautionary advice "that its opinion in Great Lakes
'was not intended to give approval to this method of proving damage, except in an extreme
case and under proper safeguards'"); Urban Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States,
187 Ct. Cl. 15, 36 (1969) (pointing out no determination had been made as to amount of
plaintiffs damages and citing to McGraw court's reference to decision in Great Lakes and
quoting that it "was not intended to give approval to this method of proving damage,
except in an extreme case and under proper safeguards."); Phillips Constr. Co. v. United
States, 184 Ct. Cl. 249, 260-61 (1968) (noting that "total cost" method is "not preferred by
the courts" and only will be used in "instances where, for lack of an alternative, the court
deemed it necessary to compute the amount of recovery" in this way and further noting
"[as] explained by the court in a much-quoted excerpt from its opinion in McGraw...
'olur opinion in Great Lakes was not intended to give approval to this method of proving
damage, except in an extreme case and under proper safeguards'").
144 F.H. McGraw, 131 Ct. Cl. at 511.
145 Idat 512.
146 Id.
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Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States,147 the court repeated the
concerns expressed in F.H McGraw, but nonetheless still allowed
the plaintiff to use the "total cost" method.148 Noting that an
"[(1)] accurate determination of such increased labor costs is not
possible,"149 and that defendant's argument of the plaintiff
"magnify[ing] the difficulties" was not borne out by the record,150
the court held for the plaintiff stating: "[(2)] [W]here there is
nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs bid was too low, and
[(3)] when it has not been proved that plaintiffs costs were
unreasonable, or [(4)] that plaintiff was itself responsible for any
increased costs, we have no alternative [but to grant relief]."51
So here the court mentions all four future "total cost" method
requirements. In 1962, in River Construction Corp. v. United
States,152 the court disallowed damages because plaintiff did not
prove its underlying claim, but the court did look at the issue of
proving damages.153 It also repeated the concerns expressed in
FH. McGraw, and in dicta noted that extra "costs must be tied in
to fault on the defendant's part."154 In 1965, in J.D. Hedin
147 150 Ct. Cl. 189 (1960).
148 Id. at 200 (reminding parties that method used to prove damages was not
satisfactory because it assumed plaintiffs costs were reasonable, plaintiff was accurate,
and plaintiff was not responsible for any increased costs). See generally Raytheon Co. v.
White, 305 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that actual expenditures would be
increased by performance inefficiency); Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d
860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (extrapolating that inefficient performance of contractor would
lead to increased costs for adverse party).
149 Oliver-Finie, 150 Ct. Cl. at 199-200. See generally Geoffrey Creyke, Jr. & H.
Randall Bixler, Constructive Acceleration Under Government Contracts, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 154-55 (1964) (quoting courts' exegeses of situations in which
application of "total cost" method is appropriate); Capt. Gilbert J. Ginsburg, The Measure
of Equitable Adjustments for Change Orders Under Fixed-Price Contracts, 14 MIL. L.
REV. 123, 133 (1961) (citing Oliver-Finnie as illustrative of courts' analysis of "total cost"
method for equitable adjustment of damages).
150 Oliver-Finnie, 150 Ct. Cl. at 200. See Creyke & Bixler, supra note 149, at 155
(quoting court's rationale for determining that increase in cost was not due to actions of
plaintiff); see also Ginsburg, supra note 149, at 133-34 (noting requirement that plaintiffs
actions did not cause increase in damages).
151 Oliver-Finnie, 150 Ct. Cl. at 200. See Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 163 Ct.
Cl. 97, 103 (1963) (quoting court's analysis); Creyke & Bixler, supra note 149, at 155
(quoting same language from court).
152 159 Ct. Cl. 254 (1962).
153 Id. at 295-301 (providing court's detailed analysis of damages claimed and
inadequacies of cause of action). See Massman Constr. Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 769 F.2d
1114, 1123 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing to River Constr. when noting that "leniency as to the
actual mechanics of computation does not relieve the contractor of his essential burden of
establishing the fundamental facts of liability, causation, and resultant injury).
154 River Constr., 159 Ct. Cl. at 270-71; see Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 233,
239 (1970) (citing language of River Constr.); see also Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190 n.19
(quoting same language of court).
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Constr. Co. v. United States,55 the method was actually called
"total cost" by the court.156 The court stated how the "total cost"
had been viewed with dislike, that it was not here establishing
its validity, but under proper "safeguards" and when no
alternative exists, it may be used so that lack of certainty does
not "preclude recovery."157 Finally in 1968 in WRB Corp. v.
United States,158 the four-prong test, as it is known today, was
spelled out as such by the court:
The acceptability of the method hinges on proof that (1) the
nature of the particular losses make it impossible or highly
impracticable to determine them with a reasonable degree of
accuracy; (2) the plaintiffs bid or estimate was realistic; (3)
its actual costs were reasonable; and (4) it was not
responsible for the added expenses. 159
In 1970 in Boyajian v. United States, 160 the court gave an
extensive analysis of the issue including a complete case history
of the issue up to that point.161 The court, rejecting the plaintiffs
use of the "total cost" method, said that "total cost" is only a
"starting point,"162 meaning one cannot just come into court and
claim: "These are my costs and this was my bid," without
something more.1 63 In this case the "total cost" method was
155 171 Ct. Cl. 70 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Wilner v. United States, 24
F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
156 Id. at 86. See Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & John Cibinic, Jr., The Changes Clause in
Federal Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 908, 934-35 (1967) (citing court's
use of term "total cost" in its analysis).
157 Hedin, 171 Ct. Cl. at 86. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 156, at 934-35 (citing
court's detailing of limited applicability of "total cost" method).
158 183 Ct. Cl. 409 (1968).
159 Id. at 426. See Aaen, supra note 1, at 1195-96 (quoting court's four-part test and
discussing its elements); Gergen, supra note 1, at 715 n.33 (indicating four-prong test
utilized by court).
160 191 Ct. Cl. 233 (1970).
161 Id. at 247-54. See Thomas H. Asselin & M. Catherine Harris Helms, How to
Recognize, Preserve, Present, and Prosecute Construction Contractors' Delay Claims, 40
S.C. L. REV. 943, 955 (1989) (indicating importance of Boyajian in determining feasibility
of "total cost" claims for damages).
162 Boyajian, 191 Ct. Cl. at 247. See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931
F.2d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing language from Boyajian); Aaen, supra note 1, at
1190 n.19 (noting court's indications that "total cost" method does not allow recovery
"unless acceptable evidence demonstrates that the damages claimed resulted from and
were caused by the breach").
163 Boyajian, 191 Ct. Cl. at 247. See Seger v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 766, 786-87
(1972) (holding "Ascertainment of increased costs that are directly attributable to delay
that results from changes ordered by the [plaintiffl normally are measurable with a
reasonable degree of accuracy"). See generally Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190-91 (indicating
proof required to utilize "total cost method").
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rejected because the plaintiff merely showed an accountant's
testimony of the actual cost, its costs were not segregated to show
any increased cost due to its own inefficiency, it made no
satisfactory attempt to show the original bid was reasonable, nor
did it adjust its actual cost for costs attributable to itself.164
APPLICATION OF THE "TOTAL COST" METHOD
First Prong Impracticality ofProving Actual Losses Directly
The first prong of the total cost method requires that it be
impractical to prove the cost of the "extra work" by any other
means than through the "total cost" method.165 Contractors
generally "cost a job" by making estimates on production cost
based on past experience of productivity; these estimates are
used when bidding for contracts. In heavy construction where
projects are very singular and unique it is not uncommon to have
up to a 50% difference between the low bidder and the high
bidder. This reflects the difficulty in estimating the "ideal costs"
for these jobs. This is the situation being addressed with the
"total cost" method. This would lead to the conclusion that actual
production losses on all contracts for unique construction services
are per se impractical to prove independently of the actual costs
expended by a particular contractor in actually performing the
work, and this seems to be the case. 166 Industry estimating books
give a fair approximation of costs for many construction projects,
164 Boyajian, 191 Ct. Cl. at 246-47. See Ian A.L Strogatz et al., Pricing the Delay:
Whom Do I Sue and What Do I Get, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Oct. 1997, at 4 (illustrating
various inadequacies of plaintiffs claims in Boyajian); see also Kenneth M. Cushman &
Joyce K Hackenbrach, Delays & Disruptions, 357 PLI/REAL 11, 59 (1990) (commenting:
"Although [Boyajian] court cited numerous cases involving 'situations similar to the
instant one' where the total cost theory had been rejected, it is significant that the court
stopped short of rejecting the theory per se, and holding it universally invalid").
165 See Aaen, supra note 1, at 1196 (defining lack of feasibility to determine damages
otherwise as first criterion for applying "total cost" method); Jones, supra note 51, at 31
(noting, under first prong, it must be established that no other methods are practicable in
determining damages); see also Gergen, supra note 1, at 715 n.33 (indicating
requirements of first prong of test to determine applicability of "total cost" method).
166 See Seger, 199 Ct. Cl. at 770-71 (maintaining that "substantial evidence" must be
shown by contractor "of proof of time and costs claimed to be due" when seeking
"additional compensation for extra work on changes and for I I standby and delay costs");
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1984) (noting
plaintiffs failure to prove causal link between its increased costs and breach of contract
by any particular defendant); Aaen, supra note 1, at 1190-91 (indicating necessity of
showing causation of final cost before applying "total cost" method ).
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but this prong is intended to make sure that the contractor is in a
situation where it is outside of the realm of the estimating book
so that no independent means of proof exist.
This prong also seems to get tangled up with issues of
causation. The owner's classic argument is that the contractor
has not shown that its excess costs flow directly from owner's
breach, and that the contractor has only shown its final
production costs. 167 What then is the standard of proof required?
If the contractor merely measures the cost overruns from the
entire job by summing losses from each individual task, the
contractor is not showing proof that the costs flowed from the
breach; it is merely breaking the losses into smaller
components.168 Unless it can show some "measured mile" effect
for each individual task there is no proof that the cost overrun
stems from a particular breach.169 When a court says that it is
impractical to prove losses directly it is really saying, among
other things, that no "measured mile" method exists so as to
insure the claim is reasonably certain. With respect to proof of
causation, the casual connection that the overrun stems from a
particular breach seems to be implied by many courts because of
167 See Seger, 199 Ct. Cl. at 770-71 (maintaining that "substantial evidence" must be
shown by contractor "of proof of time and costs claimed to be due" when seeking
"additional compensation for extra work on changes and for [ I] standby and delay costs");
Highland, 683 P.2d at 1044 (noting plaintiffs failure to prove causal link between its
increased costs and breach of contract by any particular defendant); Aaen, supra note 1,
at 1190-91 (indicating necessity of showing causation of final cost before applying "total
cost" method ).
168 See Aaen, supra note 1, at 1198 (indicating that use of "total cost" method should
be restricted to smallest portion of project in which cost determination is impractical);
Brotman, supra note 5, at 449-50 (arguing for unrestricted applicability of "total cost"
method to construction contracts).
169 Where the contractor alleges a loss of productivity, the preferred method of
computation is the 'measured mile'... Under the 'measured mile'
approach, claimant compares the costs of installing work not subject to
delay or impact with the costs of installing similar work during the period
subject to the alleged impact.... The additional cost of installing the work
during the period of impact or delay then serves as a measure of the
damages arising from the delay or impact, assuming that the contractor
can also demonstrate causation and liability.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., No. 93-CV-4750, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22627, at *266-67 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998) (citing United States Indus. v. Blake
Constr. Co., 671 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Circ. 1982); WILLIAM J. SCHWARTZKOPF,
CALCULATING CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES 26-27 (Wiley Law Publications 1992)); see Steven
C. Bennett, Construction Contract Damages: The "Measured Mile" Methodology, 16
TOURO L. REV. 77, 82 (1999) (defining method as comparison of work accomplished during
disrupted and undisrupted periods); Patton & Gatlin, supra note 6, at 21 (describing
method as comparison of productivity during disrupted periods and undisrupted periods
on same or similar projects).
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the difficulty of actual proof.
This prong further seems to be tangled up with documenting
the cost of the "extra work." Some courts are satisfied that proof
of the cost for the "extra work" exists when the cost of purely the
"extra work" is segregated from the cost of the original
contract. 170 This is different than what was discussed above
where impracticality of proof meant it was impossible to
independently verify the reasonableness of the claim. Some
combinations of these two factors go into the analysis of the first
prong. As mentioned earlier, in the recent case of Mergentime,171
the court said that proof of the damages exists "based upon
expert testimony, contemporaneous records, and [the owner's]
cost audits."' 72 In the older case of FH McGraw,173 the court said
proof was the cost calculated by the contracting officer.174 Both
these courts denied the contractor the chance to use the "total
cost" method because they felt that it was practical to calculate
the cost of the "extra work" without resort to "total cost." This
does not change the analysis of determining whether an
independent means of verification of the costs exists; the ability
to segregate the cost for the "extra work" is just a factor in the
analysis of this prong.
Concrete Placing Co. v. United States7 5 highlights a situation
where it was impractical to prove damages directly. The
contractor here was hired to replace joint seals on a concrete
aircraft-parking apron. 7 6 The plaintiff sought an equitable
adjustment to the contract after it incurred extra labor and
material costs due to site conditions that did not match the
requirements of the specifications.177 The actual condition
170 See Mergentime Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 89-1055 (HHG),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408, at *6 (D.D.C. July 22, 1997); Concrete Placing Co. v. United
States, 25 Cl. Ct. 369, 378 (1992); F.H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 511,
512 (1955).
171 Mergentime, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23408.
172 Id. at *6 (explaining that "actual cost" method was applicable because of sufficient
testimonial evidence available in case regarding specific costs incurred).
173 F.H. McGraw, 131 Ct. Cl. 501 (1955).
174 Id. at 512.
175 25 Cl. Ct. 369 (1992).
176 Id. at 370.
177 Id. at 374 (noting plaintiff contractor's allegations that it was "put to additional
expense as a result of defective or impossible government specifications [and] it is entitled
to an equitable adjustment").
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contained many spalled178 and deteriorated joints that required
use of an alternate repair specification that was more expensive
than originally planned; additionally, unanticipated pockets
beneath the slabs were found that required installation of
"backing rods" before placing the joint sealer. 7 9 In assessing the
total cost claim the court found the first prong the most difficult
to grapple with.180 The court resolved its concern in favor of the
plaintiff contractor because it was convinced by the plaintiffs
evidence that the spalls were intermittent with non-spalled areas
so that segregation of the costs between spalled and non-spalled
areas could not be accomplished. The court said:
Based on the fact that the spalled joints were spread
intermittently throughout the project, the court cannot
conceive of a method of distinguishing between those costs
solely incurred as a result of the government's defective
specifications and those only covered by the original bid
which would be both credible and reasonable. 181
The court noted "that the evidence showed that the estimated
16,300 linear feet of spalled joint encountered was staggered
throughout the 120,000 linear feet project."182
Had the spalled areas been completely separate from the non-
spalled areas instead of staggered or intermittent then a
"measured mile" analysis might have been done, meaning the
contractor could have measured productivity in the spalled area
versus the non-spalled area. This would represent a segregation
of the costs, something courts look to in evaluating this first
prong. The "measured mile" often requires proactive steps
though, requiring the contractor to take it upon itself to analyze
its productivity purely for the sake of some possible lawsuit in
178 A spall is lose or chipped piece of concrete that has broken away from the larger
mass of concrete.
179 Concrete Placing, 25 Cl. Ct. at 372 (noting: "Central to the dispute between the
parties is the condition of the joints prior to contract performance and how that condition
affected application of the sealant").
180 Id. at 378 (stating: "Whether plaintiff has satisfied the first criteria is a more
difficult inquiry"). See generally Thalle Constr. Co. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 39
F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting even most precise methods of calculating damages
often are prohibitively speculative or too difficult to prove); Doninger Metal Prods. Corp.
v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 110, 125 (2001) (suggesting exact computation of damages in
complex contract cases can be extremely difficult).
181 Concrete Placing, 25 Cl. Ct. at 378 (emphasis added).
182 Id. (emphasis added).
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the future. This can be impractical because a test sample of ideal
conditions may not exist or the contractor may not foresee the
need for such measures. Courts, though, have noted that this
first prong of the test requires contractors to be at least
minimally proactive.18 3 Contractors that make claims with no
proof other then the final cost when it would have been
reasonable to collect documentation on the effects of the owner's
breach have been denied recovery. 184 One court noted "the reason
why the total cost method is viewed with a 'jaundiced eye' is
'rooted in the desire to encourage contractors to maintain
accurate cost records." 8 5 One court actually denied relief in part
because the contractor failed to use a "measured mile" method
when it could have, it said: "On this Project, the 'measured mile'
approach could have been effectively employed given the
repeated construction activity in similar locations at differing
times."186 Basically this prong requires some combination of the
impossibility of "segregating" the owner caused delay from the
original cost of performance along with a showing of a lack of an
independent means of determining the reasonableness of
contractor's expended costs.
Second Prong. Reasonableness of the Bid
The Court of Claims in Baldi Brothers Constructors v. United
States8 7 presents the best and most in-depth example of a
detailed bid analysis. Plaintiff was contracted to construct a
Marine Corp training facility, and subsequently encountered
differing soil and site conditions that increased its cost of work. 88
183 Cavalier Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 193, at *66-67
(Fed. Cl. Sept. 24, 2001) ("Plaintiff's lack of diligence in preserving and safeguarding
these vital records does not justify use of the total cost approach in this case."); WRB
Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968) ("A large measure of our present
uncertainty is due to the plaintiffs complete failure to maintain accurate cost records
during performance."); Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516,
542 (1993) (stating that "plausible explanation was not proffered for such failure" to
maintain accurate records).
184 See Cavalier Clothes, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 193, at *66-67 (noting lack of
documentation fatal to claim); see also WRB, 183 Ct. Cl. at 426 (discussing claimants
own fault in not documenting costs); Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 542 (stating that accurate
records must be maintained by the claimant).
185 Cavalier Clothes, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 193, at *67.
186 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. The George Hyman Constr. Co., No. 93-CV-4750, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627, at *268 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998).
187 50 Fed. Cl. 74 (2001).
188 Id. at 75-77.
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The court found in favor of the contractor on the differing site
condition claim entitling the contractor to damages.189 The court
analyzed plaintiffs "total cost" claim, focusing intently on the
reasonableness of the bid. It looked at how the numbers in the
estimate were derived, and adjusted the calculations in the
estimate for a wrong production rate factor in the contractor's
earth moving equipment. The factor was used on a chart to
determine the volume of soil that the given equipment could
move in a day; the court noted that the factor was based on the
best soil conditions, which the plaintiff should have known did
not exist because it had visited the site. 190 This level of scrutiny
seems like the ideal method of determining a bid's
reasonableness, and owners should take it upon themselves to
"back check" the contractor's estimate for mistakes and
deficiencies. For as this case shows, where the court mentioned
the many years of experience the estimator had, experience does
not preclude the occasional mistake.191 This shows how "total
cost" is about modifying the assumptions that the contract was
based on to achieve an equitable outcome after the contract was
breached.192 When adjustments to a contractor's bid is not a
practical option courts have defined the "reasonable bid" as the
average of the higher bids for the job;193 in the original "total
cost" case of Great Lakes the court used this method. 194
As stated back in the early case of FH McGraw, the courts are
hesitant about "total cost" because it assumes the bid is
189 Id. at 79.
190 Id at 82-83.
191 Id. at 82 ("Although Pat Baldi has been working in this business since he was 'old
enough to pick up a shovel,' and has been doing earthwork estimates since he was 16, his
daily production rates for Camp Lejeune were optimistic, to say the least.").
192 See Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1308-09 (5th
Cir. 1986) (noting that that breaching party should not escape liability because amount of
damages are difficult to prove); see also Baldi Bros. Constructors, 50 Fed. Cl. at 80 ("The
modified total cost method allows the court to adjust a claim when a contractor's initial
bid is found unreasonable by substituting a reasonable bid amount into the
calculations.").
193 Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 543 (1993)
("Moreover, upon reviewing the other 11 contractors' bids, in addition to the government's
bid, the court was able to determine that Youngdale's bid was approximately 17% lower
than the average of the 12 other bids."); J.D. Hiedin Const. Co., Inc. v. United States, 171
Ct. Cl. 70, 87 (1965) (noting "closeness of the [other contractors'] bids gives support to the
reasonableness of the estimate.").
194 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 504, 559 (1951)
(adjusting bid to average of other bids and verifying reasonableness of actual costs).
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accurate.195 These concerns are reduced by using the average of
higher bids and "back checking" the original bid. Still courts
remain concerned that contractors may try to turn a dispute over
a contract adjustment into a gain when a contractor has
underbid a job. One court stated that: "[P]laintiff should not 'get
the benefit of its own failure to anticipate that level of difficulty
that a reasonable contractor should have expected."'1 96 Though
this concern is valid, in reality it is easily addressed by the
court's ability and willingness to adjust a bid upwards.
Third Prong. Reasonableness ofActual Costs
The definition of this prong says it all: "reasonableness of
actual costs." One court has described the proof needed as
follows: "[A] reasonable basis for computation and the best
evidence which is obtainable under the circumstances of the case,
and which will enable the trier to arrive at a fair approximate
estimate of loss is sufficient proof."' 97 As stated earlier, damages
from loss of productivity may be difficult to prove, and therefore
it may be difficult to establish the reasonableness of the actual
costs. For example, in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. George
Hyman Construction Co.,198 the subcontractor, represented in
this case by the surety, was contracted to perform electrical work
on an Amtrak rail station. The plaintiff claimed loss of
productivity under the "cumulative impact" theory,199 but the
court rejected the plaintiffs claim because the current state of
research in the area of lost productivity due to cumulative impact
195 F.H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 511 (1955).
196 Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 542.
197 Bagwell Coatings, 797 F.2d at 1309.
198 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1998).
199 The term 'cumulative impact' has come to mean in a generic sense, the
impact on unchangedwork which is not attributable to any one change but
flows from the synergy of the number and scope of changes issued on a
project. The underlying theory is that numerous changes cause a cascading
ripple-type of impact on performance time and efficiency which is too
uncertain or diffuse to be readily discernible at the time of pricing each
individual change.
Id. at 259-60 (quoting McMillin Bros. Constructors, Inc., No. 328-10-84, 1990 EBCA
LEXIS 10, at *32 (Dep't of Energy B.C.A. Aug. 31, 1990)); see Pittman Constr. Co. v.
United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 211, 216 (1983) (defining "cumulative impact" costs as those that
"addressed the inefficiencies and disruptions associated with changes which, when viewed
cumulatively (i.e., retrospectively), were so large in number and/or magnitude as to give
rise to a separately compensable impact claim").
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changes was just too limited to meet acceptable standards. 200 The
court stated that: "[Tihe mere expression of an estimate as to the
amount of productivity loss by an expert witness with nothing to
support it will not establish the fundamental fact of resultant
injury nor provide a sufficient basis for making a reasonable
approximation of damages."201
Fourth Prong.- Lack of Responsibility for Added Costs
The "lack of responsibility" prong is often interpreted as a
mandate to apportion fault in the "total cost" analysis,202 but it
also seems to have a more fundamental purpose, and that is to
assure the court of the equity of the matter that the non-
breaching party receive a remedy when fault is clear.203 One
court has stated both these concerns concurrently, first it stated
that: "With respect to the fourth prong of the total cost
method... we award to plaintiff only that percentage of the
adjusted total costs for which defendant is solely responsible."204
It then went on to say: "We have found significant liability on the
part of the government and conclude that modified total cost is
the only method of proof available considering the nature and
effect of the government's delay and disruption."205 Although this
prong has been dealt with in terms of "lack of responsibility" and
"apportionment of fault," if this prong is more then mere
redundancy of the merits of the underlying claim and
apportionment of fault from the third prong, then it probably
stands as justification for a recovery when fault is clear even
though proof of the amount of damages is not as clear.
CONCLUSION
The "total cost" method is way of solving the problem of
200 See Aetna, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22627, at 260-65 (discussing basis of expert
analysis of productivity loss).
20 Id. at 262.
202 Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 549-50 (1993)
(noting defendants liability for causing problem that led to overruns).
203 See Bagwell Coatings, 797 F.2d at 1309 (arguing where fault exists that non-
breaching party must receive a remedy).
204 Amertex Enters., LTD v. United States, 1995 U.S. Claims LEXIS 259, at *219
(Fed. Cl. December 15, 1995).
205 Id. at *221.
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proving damages to a reasonable certainty, a problem to which
the construction industry is particularly susceptible. It works
because the courts have accepted that when fault is certain a
non-breaching party should receive a recovery, while at the same
time it protects the party in breach from a run-away damage
claim. While courts continue to be somewhat hesitant about its
use, it seems clear that the "total cost" method is an effective tool
for achieving an equitable outcome for complicated construction
disputes involving "extra work" claims.
